Summary of 1999 Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) Chairman Letter

What were the details of the letter:

· 1999 was the worst absolute and relative performance in per-share-book value growth of BRK to date.

· Several BRK’s largest investees’ lagged the market in 1999, but the business did better than the stock. Despite the poor showing, Buffett expected BRK to modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P in the future.

· Buffett expressed his views on why S&P will do far less well in the next decade or two than it had done since 1982, unless the following factors materialize.

o Interest rates must fall further.

o After-tax corporate profitability in relation to GDP must rise.

o The public expectation on equity return must remains lofty.

· Exceptional managerial story by Bill Child, manager of R.C. Willey.

o Bill believed that R.C. Willey could successfully expand in markets outside of Utah and maintain it’s No-Business-on-Sunday policy.

o To back up his business judgment, he personally invested in the land and building of the new store in Boise.

o He would only sell it to BRK at his cost if the store proved to be successful.

o And, he refused to take any interest on the capital he had tied up.

· Insufficient pricing impacted General Re’s results.

· GEICO cost competitive advantages will be sustainable. Overall market share was 4.1% in 1999, up from 2.7% in 1996, with room for significant growth.

· Both FlightSafety International and Executive Jet Aviation had been capital intensive, but they provided services highly valued by customers.

· BRK acquired Jordon’s Furniture and to acquire a major portion of MidAmerican Energy, both from respected referrals.

· Change in goodwill accounting; the end of pooling-of-interests method.

· Look for companies with truly durable competitive advantage.

· Repurchase of BRK shares would only have a minor effect on the future rate of gain in its intrinsic value.

Practical application:

· Identify and associate with first class people.

· Look for people who are willing to tie up their money with their business action.

· Compensation plans have to be simple, directly to relevant operating activities.

Quotes from the letter:

· “We have no contracts at Berkshire. Rather, they [managers] work long and hard because they love their businesses. And I use the word “their” advisedly, since these managers are truly in charge – there are no show-and-tell presentations in Omaha, no budgets to be approved by headquarters, no dictums issued about capital expenditures.”

· “In Ajit, we have an underwriter equipped with the intelligence to properly rate most risks; the realism to forget about those he can’t evaluate; the courage to write huge policies when the premium is appropriate; and the discipline to reject even the smallest risk when the premium is inadequate.”

· “An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what’s presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed.”

· “What’s particularly entertaining in these books [sell-side research] is the precision with which earnings are projected for many years ahead. If you ask the author-banker, however, what his own firm will earn next month, he will go into a protective crouch and tell you that business and markets are far too uncertain for him to venture a forecast.”

· “If we have a strength, it is in recognizing when we are operating well within our circle of competence and when we are approaching the perimeter. Predicting the long-term economics of companies that operate in fast-changing industries is simply far beyond our perimeter. If others claim predictive skill in those industries – and seem to have their claims validated by the behavior of the stock market – we neither envy nor emulate them. Instead, we just stick with what we understand. If we stray, we will have done so inadvertently, not because we got restless and substituted hope for rationality. Fortunately, it’s almost certain there will be opportunities from time to time for Berkshire to do well within the circle we’ve staked out.”

3+ questions to the group & group discussion:

· Corporate culture, how important is it? Can we identify strong culture based on the numbers?

· How do we become an experienced observer in a particular field without relying on the financial numbers being presented as is?

· Key metrics and people—how to identify which factors are relevant?

Summary of 1991 Berkshire Hathaway Chairman Letter

What were the details of the letter

· “Look-through” earnings consist of:

· The operating earnings reported on GAAP basis.

· Retained operating earnings of major investees.

· An allowance for the tax of investees’ retained operating earnings.

· Change in Media economics:

· Competition for eye balls.

· “Bob-around” pattern.

· Future earning prospects impact valuation significantly.

· Does not sell permanent holdings.

· Franchise has a product or service that is:

· Needed or desired;

· No close substitute as determined by its customers;

· Not subject to price regulation.

· Existence of such enterprise can be shown from its pricing power and high rates of return on capital.

· Weak franchise vs. Strong business.

· Ownership of See’s has taught Buffett much about evaluation of franchises.

· Brought H.H. Brown:

· Tough business, but outstanding management.

· Distinguish compensation system.

Practical application

· Create a portfolio that will deliver the highest possible look-through earnings a decade from now. This approach is to force an investor to focus on long-term business prospects.

· Focus on economic franchises.

Quotes from the letter

· “Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient.”

· “If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say, to private companies in Omaha, I would, first, try to assess the long-term economic characteristics of each business; second, assess the quality of the people in charge of running it; and, third, try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price.”

3+ questions to the group & group discussion

· What kind of checks and balances do we need to have in place to ensure that we follow established principles?

· Investments in USAir (US Airways), Salomon Brothers, and Fannie Mae—What are the mistakes that we could avoid?

· Franchise vs. Business—how do we distinguish between the two?

Summary of 1987 Berkshire Hathaway Chairman Letter

1-Minute Summary

· The 1987 letter focused on how to identify business with strong franchise: what factors to consider, how manager should be evaluated, and which numbers are important to the owners.

· In addition, the kind of temperament needed for successful investment operation.

Practical application

· Seeking for the “fortress-like” business franchise

· Really figure out the core competitive advantages of a business

o What value or quality proposition does a particular business brings to its customers.

§ NFM: saving

§ BNews: news hole

§ See’s: superb candy and customer service

o Example: BH insurance unit’s competitive advantages are its strong financial standing and sound underwriting policy

Quotes from the letter

On management

· “The managers of the units should be judged by the returns they achieve on the underlying assets; what we pay for a business does not affect the amount of capital its manager has to work with.”

· “Our managers protect their franchises, they control costs, they search for new products and markets that build on their existing strengths and they don’t get diverted.”

· “Management changes, like marital changes, are painful, time-consuming and chancy.”

On business

· “But a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error.”

· “Making the most of an already strong business franchise, or concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually produced exceptional economics.”

· “We neither understand the adding of unneeded people or activities because profits are booming, nor the cutting of essential people or activities because profitability is shrinking. That kind of yo-yo approach is neither business-like nor humane.”

On investment

· “When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts – not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts.”

· “Our goal is to find an outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do; with sow’s ears, we fail.”

· “An investor will succeed by coupling good business judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the marketplace.”

· “Eventually, our economic fate will be determined by the economic fate of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or total.”

· “The speed at which a business’s success is recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the company’s intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate. In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.”

· [On items like efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas] “Their [people’s] interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising ‘Take two aspirins’?”

3+ questions to the group & group discussion

· What weakness/action do you current have that hinder you to stay insulated from market emotions?

· How can you improve on judgment of characters?

· What are the differences between intelligent and unintelligent capital allocation?

Berkshire Hathaway 1971 Chairman Letter

Berkshire 1971 Chairman Letter

1 Minute Summary:

• By the end of 1970, Buffett and Susie's ownership in Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) was approx. 36%.
  
• Buffett had figured out a new type of business (insurance float).
  
• Insurance business was becoming the future of BRK.
  
• Inflation was high at the time (average 4-5%, compared to 1-1.5% in 1955-1965)
  
• U.S. was off the gold standard in 1971 (Nixon Shock).
  
• (Not in the letter) Blue Chip Stamps saw its business model deteriorated. To replace the earnings in the business, president of Blue Chip Stamps suggested that See's Candies was for sale (Munger loved the business, but the price tag was considered expensive at the time—$25m for $5m assets).
  

What were the details of the letter:

• BRK was showing better return on capital (14%, excluding capital gains) as a result of redeployment of capital that started five years ago.
  
• Buffett discussed operations in the three segments (Textile, Insurance, and Banking).
  
• Home & Auto was a major purchase of the year.
  

New Terminology / concepts / ideas / useful examples:

• Management objective should be to improve return on total capitalization, as well as the return on equity capital.
  
• Find managers with talent for operating profitably and enthusiasm for the business.
  
• It would be even more beneficial for the owner if the managers have substantial ownership and pride in the company.
  

  
  

Practical application:

• Track record: Compare statements and/or objectives made by managers in previous years with actual financial results in current year.
  
• Insider ownership: Check managers' ownership to see if it is significant. Also check how they've acquired and how long they've had the shares.
  
• Due diligence on management: What if the company has excellent financial results, significant insider ownership, but questionable characters at senior level (ex. American Apparel).
  

Quotes from the letter:

• "We retain a fundamental belief in operating from a very strongly financed position so as to be in a position to unquestionably fulfill our responsibilities."
  
• "We set no volume goals in our insurance business generally—and certainly not in reinsurance—as virtually any volume can be achieved if profitability standards are ignored."
  

3+ questions to the group & group discussion:

• What is the best way to establish and maintain loyalty in relationship with others?
  
• What is the key to perseverance?
  
• How do you identify good character?
  
• Following the crowd—the good and bad?

Chapter 51—Discrepancies between Price and Value (Continued)

One Minute Summary:

This chapter gave additional reasons for discrepancies between price and value of a security, such as seasoned and unseasoned issues, contractual and non-contractual comparables, and special supply and demand circumstances.

Chapter in Detail:

Seasoned issue—an issue of a company has a high reputation among investors due to its long and successful operating history. The price of a seasoned issue may exhibit price inertia even when its financial statements or future prospects have been weakened.

Unseasoned issue—an issue that usually belongs to the industrial field. Unseasoned issues are very sensitive to adverse developments of any nature. Therefore, during a business storm, a group of unseasoned issues is likely to suffer more than a group of seasoned issues, which speculative opportunities may arise for a security buyer.

Misuse of comparables—an issue is quantitative preferable to others in a similar industry does not imply that issue is a sound purchase. The issue must be considered as attractive on a stand-alone basis.

Contractual related comparables—when a senior issue is more preferable than its junior securities based on quantitative factors, one should consider switching to the senior issue as a sound investment. Any improvement in the business should reflect a better return than one made in the common stock.

Special supply and demand factors—short-term speculative purchases due to temporary excitement in an issue, or its related industry.

Practical Application:

1. Washington Mutual (WaMu) as a seasoned issue—an analyst may examine WaMu’s financial statements and reveal significant information about its financial position. At the peak of WaMu’s operation, the option ARMs and subprime mortgage represent over 50% of its loan portfolio.
2. Buy an issue that you can fully understand its business fundamentals, unless a significant, demonstrable discrepancy exists between its current price and value.

Three Quotes:

1. “We have warned against an overready acceptance of a purely quantitative superiority. The future is often no respecter of statistical data.” Pp. 691
2. “He buys by reputation rather than by analysis and he holds tenaciously to what he has bought. Hence holders of long-established issues do not sell them readily, and even a small decline in price attracts buyers long familiar with the security.” Pp. 688
3. “These disparities [of prices between senior and junior securities] arise from the frequent failure of the general market to recognize the effect of contractual provisions and often also from a tendency for speculative markets to concentrate attention on the common stocks and to neglect the senior securities.” Pp. 693

Three questions to the group to test understanding:

1. Why price inertia exists?
2. In valuing comparables between companies in the same industry but with different capital structure, how would the analyst account for the differences?
3. When an industrial issue appears to be undervalued from its comparables, what would be the best course of action?

Clarifications & Group Discussion:

1. Would you consider expanding your investment horizon to include more senior securities?
2. What other additional factors may contribute to discrepancy between price and value?
3. Do we have more “seasoned” industrial issues today?
4. Technical analysis is a form of special supply and demand?

Chapter 43—Significance of the Current-Asset Value

Chapter 43—Significance of the Current-Asset Value

One Minute Summary:
This chapter is about using current asset value as an approximation of a company’s liquidation value—book value of current assets should be adjusted to reflect liquidation value. Companies that are selling under liquidation value usually demonstrated unsatisfactory earnings trend, which may continue to operate at a loss and nullify the intrinsic value to below price paid. As a result, the analyst should examine companies that have reasonable basis of earning improvement based on past records and future prospects.

New terminology / Concepts / Ideas / Technical Items / Useful Examples:
• During liquidation, non-current assets are to experience the most shrinkage; thus, as a safety measure, current asset value provides a rough measure of the liquidating value.
• History may serve as an indication of future. In the chart, Manhattan Shirt would likely to yield better results since its net current asset was reduced by 10% during a very difficult period, compared to 60% of Hupp Motor.

Additional comments:
• Liquidating/market value for real estate, buildings, machinery, equipment, nonmarketable investments, intangibles, etc are more easily obtainable today. If the analyst is confidence about his/her source of information, the percentage of liquidating value to book value can be adjusted higher than what is suggested by the chapter.

Practical Application:
• Past history of a bargain issue should be examined to determine whether an investment in such issue will yield satisfactory results in the future.
• To be considered as an attractive investment, these bargains must have potential catalysts in either improvement in future earnings, potential sale or merger, or liquidation distribution.

Three Quotes:
1. “Common stocks that (1) are selling below their liquid-asset value, (2) are apparently in no danger of dissipating these assets, and (3) have formerly shown a large earning power on the market price, may be said truthfully to constitute a class of investment bargains.” Pp. 570
2. “…voluntary withdrawal from an unprofitable business, accompanied by the careful liquidation of the assets, is an infinitely more frequent happening among private than among publicly owned concerns.” Pp. 559
3. “Dividends paid to common-stock holders do not in themselves make the stock any safer. The directors are merely running over to the stockholders part of their own property; if the money were left in the treasury, it would still be the stockholder’s property.” Pp. 573

Three questions to the group to test understanding:
1. What kind of liabilities may be off balance sheet?
2. How would you go about to confirm the book value of current assets on the balance sheet?
3. How would you value the capitalization structure when the debt instruments (preferred or fixed coupon debts that have a convertible feature into common stocks)?

Clarifications & Group Discussion:
1. Case study of Bennett Environmental Inc.

2. What essences should we take away from this chapter since the “net-nets” are less obvious in today’s market?

3. Today, some businesses may have their intangible assets understated. Would you consider “mark-up” the value of these assets? If yes, how would you assess the value, and should the intangibles be considered as a current asset?

4. Would you apply similar discount percentage to the book value for different asset classes suggested by the chapter?

Chapter 37—Significance of the Earnings Record

Chapter 37—Significance of the Earnings Record

One Minute Summary:

The chapter goes over the significance, as well as pitfalls, of the earnings record.

Chapter in Detail:

Earnings record is used to as a starting point to judge a company’s future earning power. Because a long history of earnings demonstrate some quantitative and qualitative factors of a company, earnings record must cover a number of years to gauge a company’s future earning power For example, a stable rising trend of earnings over a period of 20 years may suggest that the company exhibited favourable prospects during various business cycles.

However, there are a number of key points that should be considered with the company’s earnings record:

1. If there is a quantitative trend, the trend needs to be coupled with supporting qualitative factors:

a. Industry characteristics

b. Inherent stability of the company

c. Future outlook, etc.

2. Valuation should not be based on current earnings.

a. A single year of earnings may only demonstrate the company’s earning power during a particular point of a business/industry cycle

3. Distinctions between average and trend of earnings.

a. Trend may be deceptive

i. Poor prior results

ii. Future competition

iii. Sensible business man approach

4. Deficits should be considered as a qualitative factor

a. A wide variation in the earnings record decrease the representative character of the average

5. Intuition vs. sound analysis

a. Identified qualitative factors should be based on sound reasoning

New terminology / Concepts / Ideas / Technical Items / Useful Examples:

· Intuition vs. Sound reasoning

Additional comments:

· Pension liability and its future impact on the earning power of a corporation should also be considered

· Ignore the share data and look strictly at the total value, e.g. total earnings vs. market cap/enterprise value

Practical Application:

· The analyst should survey the up-to-date and future corporate developments of a company. For example, a company may issue a large quantity of purchase rights as part of an equity financing deal that would be dilutive to future earnings.

· Positive trend of earnings may be deceptive by accounting applications and easily exaggerate the stock price of a company. It’s important to take a private businessman’s perspective and insist on paying a reasonable price based on demonstrated earnings power in the past and confirming that such trend would at least remain in the future.

Three Quotes:

1. “It is the most important because the sole practical value of our laborious study of the past lies in the clue it may offer to the future; it is the least satisfactory because this clue is never thoroughly reliable and it frequently turns out to be quite valueless... [However,] the past exhibit remains a sufficiently dependable guide, in a sufficient proportion of cases, to warrant its continued use as the chief point of departure in valuation and selection of securities.”

2. “The analyst cannot follow the stock market in its indiscriminate tendency to value issues on the basis of current earnings. He may on occasion attach predominant weight to the recent figures rather than to the average, but only when persuasive evidence is at hand pointing to the continuance of these current results.”

3. “The divergence in method [of valuing a company’s share price] between the stock market and the analyst...does not mean that the analyst is convinced that the market valuation is wrong but rather that he is not convinced that its valuation is right.”

Three questions to the group to test understanding:

1. What kind of non-cash items can impact an income statement?

2. What are some hidden expenses that may not be reported on an income statement?

3. With a significant write-off of assets, what impact will this have on a company’s future income statements?

Clarifications & Group Discussion:

1. Case study of Decker’s Outdoor Corp.

2. What kind of qualitative factors should we look for to support the quantitative data?

3. When a company is sold at what seem like a generous valuation in relation to the average of past earnings record and future prospects, should the analyst take action and short the stock, or should he/she ignore such development and spend his/her time to identify other undervalued stocks?